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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090148-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate-review jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment 
when the State's attorneys committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct what 
was perjured testimony by a material witness. (R. 473: 304; 395). A trial court's 
decision regarding a defendant's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d 1278. 
"This standard is met if 'the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result 
for the defendant.'" Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10 (internal quotations omitted). And the 
"overriding concern is that defendant received a fair trial." pritchett 2003 UT 24, f^ 10. 
This issue was preserved in arguments made during trial (R. 473: 304-) and in a motion 
to arrest judgment (R. 395, 373-71). 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing prior bad acts of Doyle involving drug 
use to be admitted as evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad 
acts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^ 24, 52 
P.3d 1194; see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 18, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was 
preserved in a written motion and in oral arguments to the trial court (R. 114-12, 474: 3-). 
CONTROLLING CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in 
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if 
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jullyn Doyle appeals from a jury's conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 
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possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37a-5(l) before the Honorable Darold J. McDade of the Fourth District Court. 
Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
The State charged Defendant by Information, dated July 6, 2007, with one count 
of Possession or Use of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and one count of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 1). Subsequent to the preliminary hearing held on October 15, 
2007, the trial court found probable cause and bound both charges over for trial. (R. 39-
41). Defendant entered pleas of not guilty on both counts. (R. 39-41). 
Defendant filed a Demand for 404(b) Evidence on November 15, 2007. (R. 44). 
At the pre-trial conference, the parties discussed issues regarding discovery and evidence 
to be presented at trial. (R. 471). Defendant notified the court and filed a Motion in 
Limine regarding the admission of hearsay statements and the exclusion of possible Rule 
404(b) evidence. (R. 471: 6-12; 101-02). The following day, December 4, 2007, the 
State filed its Notice of Intent to introduce 404(b) evidence at trial. (R. 110). That same 
day, however, Defendant and the State stipulated to continuing the trial because results of 
a fingerprint test may not have been available by trial. (R. 117). 
On December 20, 2007, the State filed its response to Defendant's Request for 
Discovery and Specific Discovery and its Memorandum iq Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion in Limine on December 21, 2007. (R. 196; 201). The State then filed its 
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Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine [To Exclude] Prior Bad and Defendant filed 
her Reply. (R. 210; 221). On February 4, 2008, at oral argument on Defendant's Motion 
in Limine regarding possible Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court denied Defendant's 
motion. (R. 474). Defendant filed a Notice of Petition for Permission to Appeal From 
the trial court's Interlocutory Order on March 18, 2008. (R. 247). That Petition was 
ultimately denied by this Court on May 2, 2008. (R. 254). 
At pre-trial conference on June 23, 2008, the trial court granted Defendant's 
motion to sever Defendant's case from her co-defendant, Jorge Lopez-Navarette and the 
final pre-trial conference was set for September 15, 2008. (R. 260-262). On September 
15, 2008 the State filed an amended Information, modifying count one to Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and count two to Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 288). 
Defendant filed her Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of a 2007 DUI and an 
associated crime lab report. (R. 294). That motion was denied the morning of trial on 
September 24, 2008. (R. 312). On September 25th, the second day of trial, Defendant 
submitted a written Motion to Dismiss. (R. 313-321). That motion was discussed in 
chambers and denied. (R. 326). The jury convicted Defendant of both counts of the 
Information as charged. (R. 322-26). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment and sentencing is continued to 
January 12, 2009. (R. 395; 373-71). On January 12, 2009, the trial court addressed 
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Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and sentencing. (R. 444-48). The trial court 
denied Defendant's motion. (R. 444-48). 
Doyle was sentenced according to statute on each count, but the prison/jail time 
was suspended except for 90 days to run consecutive with any other commitments, thirty-
six months supervised probation and a fine of $975.00. (R. 444-48). Defendant filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2008. (R. 460). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of Brandon Johnson 
Brandon Johnson is a deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Office and is also a 
member of the Utah County Metro SWAT team (R. 472: 126, 127). On June 28, 2007 he 
participated with the SWAT team on the execution of a no-knock, nighttime search 
warrant inside a trailer (R. 472: 132). 
The team deployed two audio distraction devices outside the residence before 
entering the trailer (R. 472: 133). Johnson was the last one "through the door" (R. 472: 
133). He walked into the living room, saw a small child and picked her up (R. 472: 135). 
They were momentarily attacked by a pit bull before he toc>k the child outside (R. 472: 
135). 
Outside he tried to calm the child down, letting her know they were police officers 
and that she was safe (R. 472: 135-36). 
B. Testimony of Shantel Cuenca 
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Shantel Cuenca is an inmate at the Utah State Prison, serving a sentence for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (R. 472: 142). 
In June of 2007 she was living in a trailer in Springville (R. 472: 142). She lived 
with approximately six other individuals (R. 472: 143-44). Cuenca sold 
methamphetamine out of the residence beginning in February of 2007 (R. 472: 145-46). 
On the night of June 28, 2007 she was at home with approximately 13-14 other people 
(R. 472: 143). One of her daughters was also present at that time (R. 472: 149). 
That night there was a "raid" and police kicked down her doors and entered the 
trailer (R. 472: 146). At the time she was in the back bedroom (R. 472: 146). She had 
just finished selling "some stuff and was smoking methamphetamine on her bed with 
"Nikki (Leticia)..., Jullyn and George (Jorge Navarette)" (R. 472: 147. 148). That night 
she had sold some drugs to Nikki (R. 472: 160-61). 
When asked if she saw Jullyn, the defendant, smoke meth, she said, "As I recall, 
yes" (R. 472: 148). There was a methamphetamine pipe that everybody smoked from, 
including Doyle (R. 472: 158-59, 164). Cuenca testified that Doyle had purchased 
methamphetamine from her before (R. 472: 151). 
When the noise distractions went off, everybody "hit" the floor (R. 472: 151). 
Cuenca grabbed the methamphetamine, which was out in the open on a little refrigerator 
next to her bed (R. 472: 151-52, 162). She also had drugs underneath her mattress and in 
her purse (R. 472: 152). 
Sometime during the search, Cuenca heard an officer mention a "bag that was in 
between Jullyn and George" (R. 472: 153). Drugs were also discovered inside a Doritos 
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bag on her bed (R. 472: 153-54). Cuenca testified she "had no clue what was in [the 
bag], but [she] claimed everything in the home" (R. 472: 153). Later she testified that the 
Doritos bag belonged to an individual who was on the porch at the time of the raid (R. 
472: 162). 
Cuenca told police that Doyle was at the residence to "pick up my daughter" (R. 
472: 155). Cuenca acknowledged testifying earlier at the preliminary hearing (R. 472: 
155). At that time she testified again that Doyle was there to "pick up my five-year-old 
daughter" and that Doyle was "back in my room to pick up some money for me" (R. 472: 
156). She did not mention that Doyle was smoking methamphetamine at that time 
because "no one asked" (R. 472: 156, 169). She also testified that she could not recall 
police asking if anyone was smoking at the time the warrant was executed (R. 472: 162). 
Cuenca testified that she was convicted of possession with intent to distribute in 
this case and in another case (R. 472: 157). In addition, the following exchange occurred 
between Cuenca and one of the prosecutors, Ryan Peters: 
PETERS: Were you ever given a deal on your charges for—in exchange for 
your testimony today? 
CUENCA: No. 
PETERS: Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way? 
CUENCA: No, I always told everybody I wouldn't jie 
(R.472: 158). 
A similar exchange occurred on cross-examination: 
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DODD: And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal to 
testify against Ms. Doyle? 
CUENCA: Nope. 
DODD: You've been convicted since then? 
CUENCA: I have.... 
DODD: How many separate inc—at least two separate incidences that 
you've been convicted for felonies? 
CUENCA: Yes. 
DODD: What were those incidents? 
CUENCA: Well, no, there's been three.... 
DODD: ... Did you take deals on those, or did you take those to trial like 
we're doing today? 
CUENCA: Nope, I'm on a five to life. 
DODD: So you actually took a deal, you pled guilty? 
CUENCA: Yeah, pled guilty to them. 
DODD: All right, and the State didn't offer you a deal at that time? 
CUENCA: Nope. 
DODD: Okay. So you're doing this just—why are you testifying today? 
CUENCA: Everyone's askng me to. 
DODD: Who's "everyone"? 
CUENCA: The prosecutor, you 
(R. 472: 166-68). 
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C. Testimony of John Barson 
Provo City Police Officer John Barson is currently assigned to the Utah County 
Major Crimes Task Force (R. 472: 176). Although he hasj received past training in the 
area of drug recognition, he is not currently certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (R. 
472: 176). 
In June of 2007 he was also assigned to the task force and was investigating 
Shantel Cuenca in regards to possible drug trafficking (R. 472: 179, 216). He conducted 
surveillance on her home in Springville and eventually served a search warrant on her 
residence at approximately 11 p.m. on June 28, 2007 with assistance from the Utah 
County SWAT team (R. 472: 180, 182). 
He entered the trailer after it had been secured (R. 472: 182-83). Three other 
individuals were in the master bedroom seated on the bed—including Cuenca, Nikki and 
a male (Jorge) (R. 472: 187, 190). Located on the floor between Doyle and Jorge was a 
small, clear plastic baggie that contained methamphetamine (R. 472: 188, 190). It was 
"within inches of her foot" (R. 472: 190). 
There was a "strange chemical odor in the air" of the master bedroom (R. 472: 
195). Barson testified that he associated the smell with freihly burnt methamphetamine 
(R. 472: 195, 196). Doyle objected to this testimony and requested information as to 
Barson's training in regards to methamphetamine and its odor (R. 472: 195). Barson 
testified that he attended a 60-hour training in how methamphetamine is made, and that in 
addition, he has "been in numerous homes and vehicles Where methamphetamine was 
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being or had just been smoked; and this was similar to those odors" (R. 472: 196). He 
also testified that the air was hazy (R. 472: 196). 
Drugs and paraphernalia were also found on the bed between the mattress and the 
box springs, on a night stand in the room (pipe or bong), on Cuenca's person, and in a 
Doritos bag on the bed (R. 472: 197). Barson also saw a fragment of a glass meth pipe 
with residue on it on the floor of the master bedroom (R. 472: 198). Cuenca claimed 
ownership of the drugs except for "the stuff on the floor" (R. 473: 247). 
Barson subsequently interviewed Doyle in one of the other bedrooms (R. 472: 
203). Barson testified she was "extremely confrontational, very verbally aggressive"; 
and she was physically agitated (R. 472: 203, 204). She was moving constantly and had 
a "very loud voice, yelling, a lot of—a lot of mannerisms and physical attributes of 
someone that may have been under the influence of a central nervous stimulant like 
methamphetamine" (R. 472: 204). Doyle objected to this last testimony and asked that it 
be stricken because Barson was not qualified to make such an assumption in regards to 
being a drug recognition expert (DRE) (R. 472: 204). The trial court sustained the 
objection and ordered that statement stricken (R. 472: 204). 
Barson terminated the interview due to her behavior. However, Doyle 
subsequently asked to speak with him approximately 30 minutes later (R. 472: 205). 
Doyle told him that "she knew that there was methamphetamine in that bedroom. She 
stated... that she knew it was being prepared to be consumed" (R. 472: 206). Doyle also 
told him that she was there to pick up Cuenca's children (R. 472: 207). Doyle also 
denied that the methamphetamine and paraphernalia belonged to her (R. 472: 211). 
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On the second day of trial, Barson also testified (R. 473: 233-). Barson testified 
that he had arrested "hundreds" of individuals in DUI an4 possession cases who were 
later confirmed to have been on methamphetamine while he observed them (R. 473: 234-
35). Doyle again objected to this testimony (R. 473: 235). The trial court again sustained 
the objection (R. 473: 236-37). However, Barson was subsequently allowed to testify to 
the physical manifestations or behaviors of individuals under the influence of 
methamphetamine or other central nervous system stimulants: "constant movement, lots 
of hands gestures. There's bruxism, which is flexing the muscles in the jaw, grinding of 
the teeth, constant talking, loud voice, aggressive, assertive behavior that's not normal, 
physically aggressive behavior" (R. 473: 238). Barson also testified over objection that 
Doyle "was verbally aggressive, physically animated. She exhibited many of the 
symptoms that I, per my experience, have associated with methamphetamine use" (R. 
473: 240). Barson concluded there was no need to obtaih a blood draw from Doyle 
because it was "obvious" that she "was under the influence of methamphetamine at that 
time" (R. 473: 241). 
D. Testimony of Roy Edwards 
Officer Roy Edwards assisted Barson with the execution of the search warrant (R. 
473: 256). He was assigned to search the master bedroom (R. 473: 257). He found four 
people sitting on the bed, all in custody (R. 473: 258). He also immediately noticed a 
meth pipe, and a little baggie of meth on the floor (R. 473: 258). A bag of 
methamphetamine was also found on Cuenca's person (R. 473: 259). Cuenca also 
informed the officers there was more meth in a Doritos b^g on the bed (R. 473: 261). 
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After the four individuals were taken to another room, Edwards fund cash and more bags 
of methamphetamine under the mattress (R. 473: 262). He testified that the Doritos bag 
and the meth on the floor were within Doyle's reach (R. 473: 267). 
E. Testimony of Dennis Chapman 
Utah County Sheriffs Deputy Dennis Chapman testified that on February 9, 2006 
he initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Doyle (FL 473: 271). He found her 
behavior—nervousness, twitching, shaking, inability to sit still—suspicious and so he 
questioned her about methamphetamine use (R. 473: 272-73). Chapman testified that 
Doyle admitted to using "meth recently" and that "she couldn't afford to purchase meth 
on her own. So she smoked meth whenever she got a chance" (R. 473: 273). Urine and 
blood samples were obtained from Doyle at that time and methamphetamine was found 
to be in her system (R. 473: 273-74). 
F. Testimony of Anna Shide 
Anna Shide is a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Forensic Toxicology (R. 473: 
285). She testified that she tested a blood sample collected from Doyle on August 29, 
2007 that was positive for methamphetamine (R. 473: 291-93). 
G. Testimony of Gunda Jarvis 
Gunda Jarvis testified that she was Shantel Cuenca's court appointed attorney (R. 
473: 336-37). Defense Exhibits 1 (Fourth District Case Number 081401181) and 2 
(Fourth District Case Number 081401078) are Cuenca's Statements Before Pleading 
Guilty in the cases Jarvis represented her (R. 473: 341, 344-45). In Exhibit 1, Cuenca 
was originally charged with a first degree felony that was reduced to a second degree 
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felony (R. 473: 343).l In Exhibit 2, Count I was amended to a first degree without 
mandatory prison time (R. 273: 346). Cuenca also admitted to Count III (false 
information, a class C misdemeanor) and the remaining charge was dismissed (R. 473: 
345, 346). In each case, a condition of the plea agreement, entered into on May 5, 2008, 
Cuenca agreed to testify against Doyle (R. 473: 345; Defense Exhibits 1 and 2). Jarvis 
testified that if Cuenca was to testify that she did not receive a deal in exchange for her 
testimony against Doyle, that would be false (R. 473: 348). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutions, criminal defendants are entitled to due 
process of law, in that their right to a fair trial is inviolable. Here, Defendant asserts that 
the State's actions at trial, but also throughout the proceedings, fundamentally impaired 
her right to a fair trial and the trial court erred by abusing its discretion in not granting 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment because of the State's conduct. 
Although the State is "charged with vigorously enforcing the laws... [it has an] 
even higher duty to see that justice is done." State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 
1981). Thus, the State "may strike hard blows" in order to see that justice is done; it may 
not, however, "strike foul ones." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 31, 992 P.2d 951. 
Here, the State struck foul blows. 
1
 The court docket for this case also shows that two charges were dismissed: possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony; and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. 
13 
First, and foremost, the State failed in its duty to correct false testimony. Here, the 
State's material witness - Shantel Cuenca - testified that Defendant had unlawfully 
consumed a controlled substance because she was involved in the unlawful activity too. 
However, during direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Ms. Cuenca about 
whether she had received any plea deals for her testimony. Ms. Cuenca answered no. 
Coincidentally, however, Ms. Cuenca had in fact received a plea deal, specifically in 
exchange for her testimony against Defendant. And, the prosecutor - Mr. Ryan Peters -
was fully aware of this fact because he had authorized Ms. Cuenca's plea deal. Despite 
Mr. Peter's knowledge that Ms. Cuenca's testimony regarding the plea deal was false, he 
failed to correct it. Thus, Mr. Peters committed prosecutorial misconduct in failing in his 
duty to correct patently false testimony. 
Second, the State failed to disclose crucial evidence within a reasonable time 
before trial. Several months before trial, defense counsel specifically requested that the 
State provide evidence of any plea offers to any co-defendants, which included Ms. 
Cuenca. At the time of the request, no offer was made to Ms. Cuenca. However, when 
the offer was eventually made, the State failed in its duty to provide what is obviously 
exculpatory, or at the very least, mitigating impeachment evidence. 
In addition, this Court should reverse Doyle's conviction based on the trial court's 
error in admitting evidence of other bad acts under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The other acts were not admitted for appropriate non-character 
purposes. They were admitted to establish character which conforms with the actions 
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alleged in the current case, and their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any 
probative value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. In Failing to Grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss After the State's 
Attorneys Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Failing to Correct False 
Testimony, the Trial Court Abused its Discretion 
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Defendant's 
Motion to Arrest Judgment, which was based on the State's offering of and failure to 
correct perjured testimony by a material witness - Shantel Cuenca. Accordingly, 
Defendant will show that the standard of review, which is high in that it requires an abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court, is satisfied here. State v Pritchett 2003 UT 24, 
1110. 
Consequently, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the case 
based on the trial court's abuse of discretion for not granting Defendant's motion to 
dismiss in light of the State's blatant and unethical misconduct, which substantially 
impaired the Defendant's Due Process right to a fair trial. See, U.S. Const. Amend. V; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, see also, Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, \ 38 n. 7, 125 P.3d 917 
("a court must dismiss a case with prejudice in instances where prosecutorial misconduct 
is so severe that lesser sanctions could not result in a fair triall."). 
A. The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Consciously Failing to 
Correct the False Testimony of Shantel Cuenca, a Material Witness 
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a[W]hen a prosecutor is aware that testimony is false, he or she has a duty to 
correct the false impression; failure to do so requires reversal 'if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" State 
v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 116 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (quoting Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 
687, 690 (Utah 1981)). And, as this Court added, "[t]his applies even if the prosecutor 
unwittingly introduced the false testimony...." Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116. Here, the State 
relied on patently false testimony and failed to correct it, which in turn could have 
affected the judgment of the jury. 
The State offered testimony from a material witness which the State knew to be 
false and failed to comply with its duty to correct that falsehood. More than one year 
before the two-day trial, the preliminary hearing took place. At this hearing, held on 
October 15, 2007, the State, represented by Deputy County Attorney Ryan Peters, offered 
its evidence. In response to the State's evidence, Defendant called Shantel Cuenca to 
testify. (R. 470: 42). Ms. Cuenca's testimony was substantially advantageous to 
Defendant as to whether she had knowingly possessed a controlled substance.2 
Essentially, Ms. Cuenca's testimony was that she was present at the incident involving 
Defendant on June 28, 2007; that she had also been charged with criminal offenses 
related to the same incident; that at that time she had not made any promises to the State 
as part of her plea to testify in this matter; that the drugs found at the home were hers, and 
not Defendant's; and that Defendant was at the location because she was the caretaker for 
2
 The State's theory of possession was that of constructive possession. (R. 341, Jury 
Instructions). 
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Ms. Cuenca's children. (R. 470: 43-48). Based on Ms. Qienca's favorable testimony, 
defense counsel listed her as a witness for Defendant at trial. (R. 222). 
Subsequently, at trial, Ms. Cuenca switched sides and was called by the State as 
their witness. On September 24, 2008, the morning of the first day of trial, Mr. Peters 
informed defense counsel that Ms. Cuenca had changed her testimony and would be 
testifying on the State's behalf (R. 473: 310). Scrambling, due to the surprise change in 
testimony, defense counsel immediately called his secretary to get Ms. Cuenca's criminal 
background and any plea agreements. (R. 473: 310-311). In that short time defense 
counsel found one plea agreement, which he used to impeach Ms. Cuenca. (R. 473: 311). 
On May 5, 2008, more than six months prior to trial, Mr. Peters - the same deputy 
county attorney - arranged a plea agreement with Ms. Cuenca in exchange for her 
testimony against Defendant. (R. 412-13). Specifically, the State has confirmed that 
"[t]hrough plea negotiations, Cuenca was allowed to plead guilty to Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony...", and in exchange 
Defendant agreed "to testify against Jullyn Doyle...." (R. 413). Mr. Peters approved and 
signed the Statement in Support of Guilty Plea, which contained this agreement. (R. 
413). Mysteriously, however, when Mr. Peters questioned Ms. Cuenca regarding this 
plea deal he failed to correct what he must have known to be a false statement. 
During the first day of trial the State called Ms. Cuenca to testify. (R. 472: 142-
158). It was here, on direct examination, that Mr. Peters failed to correct a false 
statement from Ms. Cuenca. Specifically, Mr. Peters questioned Ms. Cuenca as follows: 
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Q: Were you ever given a deal on your charges for - in exchange for your 
testimony today? 
A: No. 
Q: Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way? 
A: No, I always told everybody that I wouldn't lie. 
(R. 472: 158) (emphasis added). Inarguably, Mr. Peters must have known her answers to 
be false because he was the prosecutor that gave Ms. Cuenca the plea deal in exchange 
for her testimony. And in an effort to get to the truth, defense counsel had a similar 
exchange with Ms. Cuenca: 
Q: And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal to testify against 
Ms. Doyle? 
A: Nope. 
Q: ... Did you take deals on those, or did you take those to trial like we're doing 
today? 
A: Nope, I'm on a five to life. 
Q: So you actually took a deal, you pled guilty? 
A: Yeah, pled guilty to them. 
Q: All right, and the State didn Jt offer you a deal at that time? 
A: Nope. 
(R. 472: 166-68) (emphasis added). Twice now Ms. Cuenca offered testimony that Mr. 
Peters knew to be false, but did nothing to correct it.3 
3
 Defense counsel waited until the morning of the second deiy of trial in hopes that Mr. 
Peters would correct Ms. Cuenca's false testimony. (R. 473: 304-05). In fact, the State 
recalled Ms. Cuenca, but again failed to correct the false statement. (R. 473: 305). 
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The following morning defense counsel brought the perjury and prosecutorial 
misconduct issues before the court. (R. 473: 304). After Arguments on the matter, the 
trial court found no misconduct on the State's part and any perjury issues would be for 
the jury to hear. (R. 473: 321-22). After being convicted, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Arrest Judgment, based on good cause that the State (1) failed to provide exculpatory 
evidence and (2) committed prosecutorial misconduct by not correcting false testimony. 
(R. 395-388). Defendant's motion was denied. (R. 466-62). 
Presently, Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
granting Defendant's motions due to the extreme nature of the misconduct and because 
Ms. Cuenca - being a witness to the events but having made a plea deal with the State in 
exchange for her testimony - gave false testimony, which presents a reasonable 
likelihood that the judgment of the jury could be affected. See, Gordon, 886 P.3d at 116. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found Ms. Cuenca "may have believed 
she actually did not receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the 
Utah State Prison." (R. 466, 462). Defendant asserts that the trial court's findings with 
regards as to whether Ms. Cuenca believed her testimony to be true as irrelevant.4 
In its findings regarding Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment, the trial court 
addressed the issues on two fronts. First, the court discussed the State's failure to provide 
discovery. (R. 466-62). Second, the court addressed whether Ms. Cuenca perjured 
4
 The trial court applied the definition of "perjury," under Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502, to 
determine whether Ms. Cuenca knowingly lied under oath. What Ms. Cuenca believed, 
however, is not determinative of Mr. Peter's misconduct by failing to correct the false 
statement. 
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herself. Defendant asserts that first, the State's actions in not providing discovery are 
reprehensible, and second, the trial court's analysis of Ms. Cuenca's perjury is inapposite 
and fails to address Mr. Peters' misconduct. 
L The State's Failure to Comply with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 is 
Illustrative of Defendant's Unfair Trial. 
First, the impetus for Defendant's unfair trial was the State's refusal to comply 
with Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(a) requires the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the defendant upon request. 
This is a "continuous duty." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 16(b). By Statute, the State is required 
to provide defendants with information on a continual basis upon request. Utah R. Crim. 
Pro. 16(a)-(b). The Utah Supreme Court, however, has affinned that under the Utah and 
Federal Constitutions, "the prosecution has a fundamental duty to disclose material, 
exculpatory evidence to the defense in criminal cases." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, Tf32, 
37 P.3d 1073 (internal quotations omitted). And that this duty to disclose "applies both 
to substantive exculpatory evidence and to that which may be used for impeachment" 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 32 (emphasis added); see also, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Here, Defendant made that request through a specific 
and general discovery request, but never received the information. (R. 48; 46). 
On November 15, 2007, the Defendant made a general and specific request for 
discovery. (R. 48; 46). Defendant requested that the State produce "[e]vidence known to 
the State which tends to negate or mitigate guilt of the accused" and "[a] copy of any and 
all written or verbal offers to any co-defendant in this case in exchange for testimony 
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against the Defendant." (R. 48; 46). In response, the State provided discovery to some 
requests and objected to others. (R. 196-192). Regarding Defendant's request for a copy 
of any offers to co-defendants, the State responded: "To date, no offers have been made 
to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant." (R. 193). That 
was submitted December 20, 2007. 
However, between December 2007 and September 2008 (the date of trial), a plea 
deal had been struck between the State and a co-defendant - Ms. Cuenca. (R. 465). 
When Ms. Cuenca entered into the plea agreement - May 5, 2008 - the State failed to 
notify Defendant of that material fact until the day of trial. (R. 465). In fact, the State 
maintained, even after this issue came to light, that they had no duty to reveal whether the 
State had entered into an agreement with a co-defendant. (R. 408-404). This attitude is 
symptomatic of the overall problem in this case - a lack of fairness. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that while the State is "charged with 
vigorously enforcing the laws..." it has an "even higher duty to see that justice is done." 
Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). So, although the State "'may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he 
is not at liberty to strike foul ones.'" State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 31 (quoting 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). To 
withhold - whether intentionally or negligently - critical impeachment evidence until the 
day of trial is a malfeasance that strikes at the core of a criminal defendant's 
constitutional due process right to a fair trial. See, U.S. Cor^st. Amend. V; Utah Const. 
Art. I, § 7. 
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ii. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Supporting its Conclusions on 
the Irrelevant Fact that Ms, Cuenca Believed Her Testimony to be True 
Furthermore, the trial court's findings regarding whether Ms. Cuenca believed to 
be the truth are inapposite. The trial court's findings state that "the State did not suborn 
perjury. 'Perjury' is a 'false material statement under oath or affirmation or swears or 
affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does not believe the 
statement to be true.'" (R. 463) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-502). Using this as a 
guide, the trial court concluded that because "Cuenca may have believed she did not 
receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the State suborned perjury." (R. 463). 
Whether the State suborned perjury is questionable because innocently the State may not 
have been aware that Ms. Cuenca would testify that she had not received a plea deal in 
exchange for her testimony. Regardless, the statement was still false. And despite what 
Ms. Cuenca believed, Mr. Peters knew differently. 
The fact remains that Mr. Peters knew that the statement was objectively false. It 
is beyond reproach or dispute that Ms. Cuenca did in fact enter into a plea agreement 
approved by Mr. Peters, which required her to testify against Defendant in this matter. 
And this occurred about four months prior to trial. Now, whether Mr. Peter's knew Ms. 
Cuenca would testify that she had not entered into an agreement is uncertain. What is 
certain, however, is that once Mr. Peters asked Ms. Cuenca on direct examination 
whether she had been offered a plea deal in exchange for her testimony and she 
responded in the negative, Mr. Peters had an affirmative and ethical duty as prosecutor to 
correct this false statement. Unfortunately, Mr. Peters failed in that duty. 
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In State v. Gordon, the defendant argued that the prosecutor failed to correct false 
testimony of two witnesses and their statements regarding the time period of when they 
saw the defendant. Gordon, 886 P.2d at 115. On appeal, this Court reasoned that the 
record adequately reflected the State's efforts "to correct the record after defense counsel 
informed the prosecutor and the trial court" of the error. Gordon, 886 P.2d at 115 
(emphasis added). Conversely, here, the State must have been aware from the instant Ms. 
Cuenca made her statements that they were false and yet still failed to correct them, even 
after having the matter brought before the trial court. (R. 475: 304). 
Presently, however, the State's actions are more akin to those in Walker v. State, 
624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). In Walker, the defendant was tried and convicted of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Walker, 624 P.2d at 688. 
Subsequently, the defendant became aware of exculpatory evidence which would have 
impeached the testimony of two officers. Walker, 624 P.2d at 688-89. On direct and 
cross examination the officers testified that no male items were found in the residence, 
which would have presented the defendant with a defense to having possessed the 
controlled substance. Id. Later, it came to light that the prosecutor knew that the officers 
statements were false, yet he failed to correct the statements. Walker, 624 P.2d at 690-
92. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "It is an accepted premise in 
American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use of false 
testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of 
justice.5" Walker, 624 P.2d at 690 (quoting Moonev v. Holohan. 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 
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340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935)). As such, the Court announced that "if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury[,]" then 
there is reason to reverse the conviction. Walker, 624 P.2d at 690, 692. 
In its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the facts of the case, which 
clearly demonstrated the State's reliance on false testimony for a conviction. 
The false impression which the prosecution knowingly fostered in the 
present case constitutes prosecutorial misconduct which seriously interfered 
with the trial court's truth seeking function. We believe this to be analogous 
to the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony and therefore subject to 
the same standard of materiality used in those cases. 
Walker, 624 P.2d at 691. As such, the Court found there existed a "reasonable 
likelihood the false impression fostered by the prosecutor could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Walker, 624 P.2d at 691. Consequently, the conviction 
was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Walker, 624 P.2d at 692. 
Similar to the conduct of the prosecutor in Walker, Deputy County 
Attorney Ryan Peters reliance on false testimony for a conviction substantially 
impaired Defendant's right to a fair trial. As illustrated, Mr. Peters was 
unquestionably aware that Ms. Cuenca had reached a plea deal - one that he 
approved. Mr. Peters, however, never corrected this falsehood, even after being 
notified of it. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, as the Utah Supreme Court 
did in Walker, that the failure to correct known false testimony is analogous to the 
prosecution's knowing use of false testimony. 624 P.2d at 691. And because of 
the nature of Ms. Cuenca's testimony, her false statements could have affected the 
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judgment of the jury. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
Cumulatively, the State's failure to provide discovery under Rule 16 and its 
misconduct by not correcting what was a blatant falsehood impaired Defendant's right to 
a fair trial requires dismissal. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that this case be 
dismissed. Or, in the alternative, the Defendant be afforded a new trial in accordance 
with Walker and Gordon. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Evidence of Doyle's Other Bad Acts 
under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Over Doyle's objection, two witnesses were allowed to testify as to her prior drug 
use. First, Deputy Sheriff Dennis Chapman testified that on February 9, 2006—more 
than 16 months prior to the execution of the search warrant on the Cuenca residence—he 
initiated a traffic stop on Doyle where she was found to have methamphetamine in her 
system and where she admitted to using methamphetamine recently. (R. 473: 271-74). 
Second, Anna Shide, a forensic scientist, testified that she tested a blood sample collected 
from Doyle on August 29, 2007—two months after the warrant—that was positive for 
methamphetamine. (R. 473: 291-93). Doyle asserts that this testimony violates Rules 
404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
"It is of course fundamental in our law that a person cap. be convicted only for acts 
committed and not because of general character or proclivity to commit bad acts." State 
v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, t 23, 8 P.3d 1025. Utah Courts have long recognized the 
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prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence. Salt Lake City v. Struhs, 2004 UT App 
489, Tl 14, 106 P.3d 188. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We do not doubt that 
'evidence of prior convictions and other bad acts has tremendous potential to sway the 
fmder of fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v. Florez, 777 
P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583, 584 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam) (Stating "[s]uch evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used with 
extreme caution because of the prejudicial effect it may have on the finder of fact"). For 
this reason there are "rigorous criteria" for admitting evidence of other crimes or wrongs 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 
1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988). 
When analyzing admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine: 
(1) whether evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose; (2) whether 
such evidence is relevant; and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial 
than probative. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(b); State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51, % 2, 88 
P.3d 359 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, lj 20, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 528 U.S. 
1164, 120S.Ct. 1181(2002)). 
"Even if evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose and is relevant, 
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence i s substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,1f 20, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 
403). Accordingly, even if Brown's prior conviction of retail theft had been offered for a 
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proper purpose and was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative under the third 
prong of the analysis. 
To be admissible, the prior bad act evidence "must have real probative value, not 
just possible worth." United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 662 (10th Cir. 1987); United 
States_y. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 612 (10th Cir. 1987). Even if the prior 
conviction has real probative value, however, it is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect 
substantially outweighs such probative value. Moreover, when certain actions of a 
current charge are similar to a previous conviction, unless those similarities are 
"peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct" and not just of the type of crime 
committed, the similarities between the two cannot be found to constitute a common 
design or modus operandi. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1990). 
The trial court denied Doyle's motion to exclude the above-referenced testimony 
based upon the following: 
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of the other bad acts to 
establish character that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. 
Rather, the State is seeking to introduce the evidence for non-character purposes— 
i.e., to show ownership or possession of the methamphetamine found in this case, 
to establish that the items found mth the drags axe m fact drag paraphernalia (as 
expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes. 
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 
because it tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter—the 
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possession or ownership of the drugs—more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. See URCrP 401. 
Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair 
prejudicial effect. The Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit 
against the defendant is prejudicial, but Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice." 
The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial and is therefore 
proper. 
(R. 242-240). Doyle asserts that the rationale behind the trial court ruling is exactly what 
Rules 404(b) and 403 are designed to prohibit. 
Doyle was charged with constructive possession of methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia due to her presence at a residence where a search warrant was executed. 
By the trial court's own admission, he admitted evidence of two other occasions where 
Doyle either admitted to methamphetamine use and/or tested positive for 
methamphetamine precisely to prove that she possessed or owned the drugs at issue on 
the date and time at issue in the trial. In other words, he admitted these other bad acts to 
prove that Doyle on this occasion acted in conformity with these other two occasions. 
This is in direct violation of Rule 404(b). Furthermore, "ownership or possession" is not 
a purpose for which such evidence is allowed under Rule 404(b). Moreover, whether the 
pipes or baggies were drug paraphernalia was not at issue. There was no argument that 
those items were not paraphernalia. In fact, those items, by their very nature were 
unquestionably paraphernalia. The baggies had drugs inside and glass pipes have very 
few if any legitimate uses—particularly not when residue is located inside. 
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Additionally, any probative value of Doyle's drug use on other occasions is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that evidence of other bad acts has "'tremendous potential to sway the finder of 
fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 
459 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, several factors have been established to assist in the 
determination of whether evidence of other crimes or bad acts should be excluded under 
Rule 403. These include: (1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, (2) the similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, (4) the need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative 
proof, and (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); see also 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at % 29, 993 P.2d 837, State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 
1990). Doyle asserts that these factors clearly weigh against admission. 
One, the only similarities between this alleged crime and the other bad acts are 
that all of them involve methamphetamine. Neither of the other two acts involved 
constructive possession or ownership, or a search warrant. Two, is the interval of time 
that has elapsed between the incidences. Doyle's admission to Chapman of recent drug 
use and that subsequent positive test for methamphetamine occurred more than sixteen 
months prior to her presence at Cuenca's residence; and the other positive test took place 
two months after. Three, the only true purpose of allowing testimony of Doyle's other 
acts involving methamphetamine was to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility towards 
her as a "drug addict." 
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The trial court failed to establish a non-character purpose that would justify 
admitting evidence of these other bad acts at trial. Indeed, the trial court's ruling clearly 
establishes that this evidence was admitted to establish that because Doyle had used 
methamphetamine on other occasions, she must have owned, possessed or used the 
methamphetamine at issue here: Once a drug user, always a drug user. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not carefully balance the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect. The trial court should have concluded that the 
probative value of other acts was slight in comparison to the substantial prejudicial effect. 
Because this error is such that there was a "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence," Doyles requests that this Court reverse her 
conviction. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Johnson requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2009^-N 
Michael Brown yLy x_--
Michael D. Esplin 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 30th day of November, 2009. 
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, #7041 
Utah County Attorney 
TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR, #8001 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
Fax:(801)851-8051 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW & ORDER 
Case No. 071402824 
JUDGE Darold J. McDade 
This case is before the Court on the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Aaron Dodd 
represented the defendant and Timothy Taylor represented the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 24 and 25, 2008, a jury trial was held wherein the defendant was 
convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. 
2. On or about November 17, 2008, prior to the imposition of a sentence, the defendant 
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. The defendant invoked two separate arguments in favor of his 
Motion to Arrest Judgment: 1) That the State of Utah failed to provide exculpatory evidence after 
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the defendant had filed a Specific Request for Discovery inquiring into any plea deals with the 
co-defendant in the case, and; 2) that the State of Utah suborned perjury by failing to correct 
alleged false testimony by a co-defendant. 
3. On or about December 10, 2008, the State of Utah filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
4. On or about December 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Reply to State's Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
5. On or about December 29, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Memorandum in 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
6. On January 12, 2009, the court received oral arguments from the parties. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
After reviewing the aforementioned documents and receiving arguments from the parties, 
the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
1. The Court finds that on or about November 15, 2007, the defendant filed a Specific 
Request for Discovery asking the State to provide a copy of any agreements between the State 
and the co-defendants in exchange for testifying against the defendant. At this point in the 
proceedings, the State responded indicating, "To date, no offers have been made to any co-
defendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant." 
2. On or about May 5, 2008, Shantel Cuenca "Cuenca", a co-defendant in the present 
case, pled guilty in two unrelated cases. In case 081401078, Cuenca plead guilty to Distribution 
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of a Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony and False Information to a 
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 081401181, Cuenca pled guilty to 
Possession of a Controlled Substance in Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony. As part of this 
plea deal, Cuenca agreed to "testify against Jullyn Doyle and Jorge Navarrette-Lopez." Cuenca 
waived time for sentencing and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison with the aforementioned 
cases running concurrently with each other. 
3. On or about September 12, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Response to 
Defendant's Specific Request for Discovery as it related to any possible plea deal with the co-
defendant. In part, the State indicated, 'The State objects to this request due to the fact that the 
items requested are not discoverable." The defendant did not objedt to the State's response 
neither did it seek the State to compel with its discovery request. 
4. The Court finds that upon receiving the State's objection to provide discovery, the 
defendant could have objected or filed a Motion to Compel in order to discover the details of any 
possible plea deal between Cuenca and the State. Therefore, the defendant was put on notice by 
the State of a possible plea deal with Cuenca but the defendant failed to further address this issue 
before the trial began. However, the Court also finds that any failure by the State to provide 
information regarding a plea deal with the co-defendant was cured when defense counsel 
thoroughly explored the details of Cuenca's plea deal during the trial by examining both Cuenca 
and the Cuenca's legal counsel in front of the jury. 
5. This Court specifically finds support for its decision in the case of State v. Bisner, 37 
P.3d 1073, (Utah 2001). In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated 
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Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this constitutional 
duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is 
in the specific instance where there is discovery after trial, of 
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to 
the defense that reversal of a conviction for nondisclosure is required. 
Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where 
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial, 
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence, 
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its 
advantage during the trial but failed to do so. 
Id at 1082-83. (emphasis in original). 
Since the defendant learned of a possible plea deal before trial but also thoroughly 
examined the details of the plea deal during the trial, this Court finds the State of Utah did not 
fail to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence and the defendant's due process rights 
were not violated. 
6. The Court finds that the case of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), is 
distinguishable to the case at hand due to the fact that the defendant in Napue did not discover 
exculpatory evidence known by the prosecutor until after the case was completed. Therefore, the 
Court finds that Napue is not controlling based on the facts in the present case. 
7. The Court also finds that the State did not suborn perjury. "Perjury" is a "false material 
statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement 
previously made and he does not believe the statement to be true." Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502. 
8. Shantel Cuenca was charged with a first degree felony and ultimately ended up 
pleading to a first degree felony. The difference between the original charge and her plea was the 
dismissal of a drug free zone which removed the penalty from a mandatory 5 years to life to a 
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penalty of not less than 5 years to life. The Court finds that when Cuenca indicated she did not 
receive a plea deal in exchange for her testimony, she may have believed she actually did not 
receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison. Since 
Cuenca may have believed she did not receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the 
State suborned perjury. 
ORDER 
Based on the aforementioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds 
there is not a good cause to arrest judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this $0 day of r^bruarij , 2009. 
4f cytrjUf J- f ~*£t 
B/Y Tlte COURT * * 
DA-RROLD J, McDADE 
/ 
Approved as to form, 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, No. 7041 
Utah County Attorney 
RYAN V. PETERS, No. 10683 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 071402824 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior 
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision. 
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introduce the following bad acts 
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial: 
1. A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while 
under the influence of methamphetamine. 
2. Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the 
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine. 
2 
3. Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
4. Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule 
404(b). 
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial 
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character 
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following: 
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character 
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to 
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the 
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact 
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes. 
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to 
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the 
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401. 
2 
Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any tanfair prejudicial effect The 
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but 
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice/' The Court finds that the evidence is not unfaiily 
prejudicial and is therefore proper. 
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts 
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at tri&l. 
Dated this day: 
3 
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THE 
MR 
THE 
the Court to 
evidence on the issue 
by the defendant, and 
allow the defendants 
COURT Anything else, Mr Dodd9 
DODD No, 
COURT It 
sufficient evidence 
dismiss and the motion 
to the 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
Court' 
DODD Your 
COURT. Yes 
DODD Your 
your Honor 
would be the 
to proceed 
for a directe 
Honor, may I 
Court's finding that 
I'll deny the motion 
d verdicjt. 
approach9 
Honor, I have a serious matter to 
s attention today. The 
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— 
of 
we 
to 
there 
to 
bring 
State calls its witness 
Shantel Cuenca. Shantel Cuenca testified on the stand that 
she in fact had no deal from the State to testify against my 
client. Your Honor, that falls — that testimony was entirely 
false. 
Your Honor, I'm submitting a plea agreement that 
Shantel Cuenca entered into the Court May 5th of 2008 in front 
of your Honor, cind her attorney was Gunda Jarvis, who was 
present. That plea agreement states that in fact she is 
receiving a beneficial plea from the State in exchange for 
testimony from my client 
Your Honor, this motion goes on to explain that under 
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Nakua vs. Illinois, a United States Supreme Court case from 
1959, citation 360 US 264, it's a due process violation, a 
violation of my client's Constitutional Rights to a fair trial, 
for the State to suborn perjury from its mam witness. 
Your Honor, I was hopeful that the State would correct 
this testimony. I was hopeful this morning when we approached 
your Honor that the State would come back, explaining what was 
going on. I was advised to bring this to your attention at the 
very beginning this morning; but I waited. I waited to see if 
the State was going to correct the false testimony today. 
When the State called Ms. Cuenca back, I expected them 
to put her on the stand and correct the false testimony that 
was given. It did not happen. The State has not corrected her 
testimony. Your Honor, she lied on the stand. She sat there 
and she told the jury that she did not receive this — any deal 
from the State, and that was entirely false. It was entirely 
false. 
She knew — I can call Ms. Gunda to the stand --
Ms. Jarvis to the stand. She knew, in fact, that she received 
a deal from the State in exchange for testimony against my 
client. She perjured herself on the stand. The State has 
allowed that perjured testimony to go forward. 
Your Honor, not only — I mean, thi_s shouldn't even 
go to the jury. This should be dismissed. The State's mam 
witness, tne one that really is fmaermg out, the only one 
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that can finger out my client, whose testimony has since 
changed -- she's changed her testimony, and that testimony has 
changed from the time that she entered this plea deal. 
Your Honor, if you recall, I subpoenaed Ms. Cuenca. 
It was my understanding she was going to testify favorably all 
along. I was the one that called Ms. Cuenca at the preliminary 
hearing. I was the one that asked for the questions, because 
she was favorable to my client. It wasn't until she entered 
this plea deal that she changed her testimony, and now she 
points the finger at my client. 
She has perjured herself. The State has not corrected 
that testimony. The State has not attempted to correct that 
testimony. It is a complete violation of my client's rights, 
and the United States Supreme Court, as interpreting the 
Constitution, demands that this case be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Is the State receiving this for the first 
time? 
MR. PETERS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you need some time to look it over, or 
do you want to respond now? 
MR. PETERS: I can respond now. Judge, it looks like 
on the 11th of September 2008 the State filed a supplemental 
response to the defendant's specific request for discovery. 
In that, and I'll read it — I don't have copies because I 
was not anticzpat1PC this motion. 
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1 The State says, "The State specifically objects to 
2 item No. 2, hereinafter request No. 2 listed in the defendant's 
3 specific request for discovery, wherein the defendant requested 
4 a copy of any and all written and verbal offers to any co-
5 defendant in this case, in exchange for testimony against 
6 the defendant. If any verbal offer was submitted to any co-
7 defendant, please include the date, time that the offer was 
8 provided, and the name of the person making that offer " 
9 That was a request made by the defense well on early 
10 in the case. I hadn't decided whether or not I was going to 
11 call Ms. Cuenca in this case; but when I did, in September, I 
12 filed this objection to their request; and I believe it has 
13 been filed with the Court. "The State objects to this request 
14 due to the fact that the items requested are not discoverable. 
15 The rules of discovery in a criminal case are laid out in the 
16 Rules of — Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16. 
17 "Rule 6o(a) states the prosecutoi must disclose the 
18 following material: statements of co-defendants or defendants, 
19 criminal record of the defendant, physical evidence seized 
20 from the defendant or co-defendants, exculpatory evidence, or 
21 any other item which the Court finds good cause, the defendant 
22 should have available. Request No. 2 does not fall with any — 
23 in any of these specifically enumerated categories. Therefore, 
24 the State objects to defendant's discovery request No. 2." 
25 The St-^e 1^a-Jy objected to th: s request. Now, when 
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1 I asked Ms. Cuenca if she was given a deal on the stand, I 
2 believe the testimony was, "What is your understanding of any 
3 deal that took place9" I am test -- I caq call officer Barson, 
4 I can call Ms. Ragan, that when we were back discussing it with 
5 her, that was what I requested, "What is your understanding of 
6 the deal that you were given in this case, if any9" Her exact 
7 response was, "Nothing. I don't believe I was given anything. 
8 I went to prison." I don't feel I was given anything. 
9 I don't believe the State has suborn perjury in this 
10 case. We have clearly put the defendant on notice that we 
11 weren't going to give him notice of any deals unless he brought 
12 it to this Court's attention, which he did not, prior to trial. 
13 September 11th, that was what, two -- two full weeks ago that 
14 he's had plenty of time to do that. 
15 That's what I'm trying to get to, Judge. My question 
16 to her was what was her understanding of a deal, if any, given. 
17 That was certainly what the State intended. It's not what the 
18 deal was. In order to get that into evidence, I would have 
19 to call her attorney, which would violate attorney/client 
20 privilege, because she obviously didn't understand what her 
21 deal was. I would also possibly have to call other attorneys 
22 that were involved in the case, and quite possibly this Court, 
23 because she pled guilty in this Court and signed the plea 
24 agreement in this Court. 
25 So I don't believe that the State has suborn perjury. 
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Again, we have clearly put the defendant on notice that we were 
not going to tell him what options we were, and we don't have 
to unless he makes an objection prior to rial, a motion, and 
the Court finds that there's good cause and forces us to do so 
That has not taken place today, has not taken place prior to 
today, and we would object to this motion to dismiss 
MR DODD Your Honor, the Court is required, under 
the Rules of Evidence and under due process, under the State's 
Rules of evidence as well, to provide to the defendant any 
exculpatory information The State knows that I called her as 
my witness at the preliminary hearing The State knows that I 
was intending to call her, because I subpoenaed her. I was the 
one that started the motion to get her here, to Court to this 
trial 
The State was well aware — because if you'll read 
that plea agreement you'11 see which is the prosecutor that 
signed that deal before your Honor The State is aware that 
that is exculpatory information Besides the fact that they 
objected to my request, that objection was not valid. I didn't 
have to d" anything further, but that's missing the entire 
point The entire point is, Ryan Peters asked her if she got a 
deal, and she said, "No " That was false testimony. 
Did they ever tell me that that was false testimony9 
I was waiting, I was hoping that they would tell me that that 
wab false testimony, and I can bring i ..tnesses in to that fact, 
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that I alerted other attorneys at my office of what was going 
on, and I was concerned, and they were concerned, and thought 
what should we do. They advised me to come to you this 
morning. I thought about it all last nigh):, and I didn't want 
to do that. I wanted to give them the chance to clean up their 
mistake, and I was hopeful that they would. 
Your Honor, the jury has heard their key witness 
perjure themselves, and the State did absolutely nothing. I 
was hopeful, I was anxious, and I asked on the sidebar, when 
the State said that they were going to call Shantel Cuenca 
again, I said, XNRyan, what's the purpose -- why are you calling 
her?" I was hoping for him to say, VAHey, I've got to clear up 
something. There was -- you know, some — she didn't testify 
exactly right." I was hoping he was going to do it. I was 
waiting for him to do it. That I wouldn't have to file this 
motion. 
Regardless of whether I was on notice or not, your 
Honor, I checked the criminal background oif every one of these 
co-defendants but Shantel Cuenca, previous to this trial. I 
didn't do it because she was my witness. When I learned that 
she had turned yesterday morning, when Mr. Peters told me, vvYou 
know what, she changed her testimony; she's on our side now," I 
had to call my secretary right then. I said, "You've got to 
give me all of her criminal background right now, this instant, 
any piea deals." 
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1 He was able to come down and find one plea agreement 
2 I don't know the status of the other cases that she entered 
3 into, but he gave me that, and got a certified copy of it and 
4 gave it to me If you recall, I asked Ms. Cuenca, "Wait a 
5 minute. Are you sure9 Are you sure the State is not giving 
6 you a deal9 Are you sure you don't want to change your 
7 testimony9 Are you absolutely sure that your testimony is 
8 truthful9 You mean to tell me the State di_dn't give you any 
9 deal9" 
10 I asked her, if you remember, several different ways. 
11 We can pull it up on the testimony, on the record. We can 
12 pull Mr. Peters guestions to her. It wasn't like "What's 
13 your understanding?" It was, "Did the State give you a deal?" 
14 "No." I was incredibly reluctant to bring this motion, but I 
15 — and I gave the benefit of the doubt as much as I could, but 
16 I was forced to. I couldn't do anything eJse. 
17 Your Honor, if you want to take some time and read 
18 through the case that I submitted from the United States 
19 Supreme Court, I request that you do that. I think you have 
20 really no other option but to dismiss this case. 
21 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Peters? 
22 MR. DODD: Your Honor, if I — I would like to call 
23 Ms. Jarvis to the stand, so she can testify regarding what she 
24 informed her client in taking this deal. 
25 MR PETERS Well, JuHge, I think that would cure the 
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problem, that Mr. Dodd seems to believe is here, by being able 
to impeach Ms. Cuenca through another witness. Perjury is 
defined -- and I can't find the exact section right now, your 
Honor, but perjury is defined as a statement made in an 
official proceeding that the witness believes to be false at 
the time she makes it. 
Again, I can call several witnesses that can say 
that she did not believe that her statement was false. I 
don't believe perjury was committed here. If the Court wants 
to allow me a few moments to find the section for perjury, 
and look at the elements, I can do that; but perjury was 
not committed here. She only has the ability to testify to 
what was in her knowledge. So I don't believe perjury was 
committed. 
Without perjury being committed -- whether or not the 
fact is true or not, isn't the issue. The fact is whether 
somebody lied about it. The way you lie about it, the statute 
says, is that you know what you're saying is false. He had the 
opportunity to question her several times. As he says, several 
statements, trying to hit it from every side to see if the 
statement that she made she knew was false. She, every time, 
said, "No, I haven't been given a deal." 
Now, he's more than -- more than allowed to call 
Ms. Jarvis to come to the stand and impeach her. I don't 
think that's an issue. I'm not objecting to that; but the 
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1 witness has to be able to testify from her own observations 
2 of what she understands to be the case. I don't believe that 
3 the State has done anything wrong in this case. 
4 THE COURT- Anything other than you've already said9 
5 MR. DODD: Your Honor, in Napua vs. Illinois, just a 
6 short summary of this case -- there's a much more serious case 
7 than this, but again, this case reminds me of (inaudible) was a 
8 murder case. So a man's life was on the line A co-defendant 
9 had already been convicted and put to death. Granted, not as 
10 serious, but still, she's facing zero to five. Her liberty is 
11 at stake. 
12 Just on the summary it states that a witness got up on 
13 the stand and testified that he didn't get a deal. He didn't 
14 get a deal from the State in exchange for his testimony. It 
15 was the same prosecutor that asked those questions that was the 
16 one that gave him that deal. It's the exact same case here, 
17 your Honor. 
18 The same prosecutor that gave thjs witness the deal, 
19 allowed the testimony to come out that, "No, I didn't get a 
20 deal for exchange of my testimony. I'm just here to tell the 
21 truth. I'm tired of my T'ays. I'm just here to tell the 
22 truth." This case is right on point. It's strikingly on 
23 p o i n t . 
24 I d o n ' t hear — I j u s t hear excuses . I j u s t hear , 
25 xvOh, well maybe she d i d n ' t unders tand ," or - - he^ test imony i s 
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is; and the ]ury clearly understood what her testimony 
I didn't receive 
exchange for my 
any consideration. I didn' 
testimony." 
If the Court needs to, your Honor, you're 
that took the plea deal; 
their crime. It's a Rul 
repeat to them the plea 
or defense Counsel puts 
exchang 
charged 
person. 
second-< 
dropped 
client. 
e for testimony a 
She was charged 
with possession 
and like every one you do, 
t receive a j 
the one 
you follow 
e 11. You ask if they understand. You 
deal that they're getting. 
on the record that this is 
gainst Jullyn Doyle, as it 
with a first-degree case. 
of a dangerous weapon by a 
The State 
in fact in 
says. 
She was 
restricted 
These are serious charges. It was reduced down to a 
degree felony, and other cases -- other charges were 
She got a deal 
Simple as that, 
in exchange for testimony against my 
and she lied. It was false testimony; 
and the State allowed it to happen and did nothing to stop it. 
MR. PETERS: Judge, I would like to respond, because 
Counsel has deemed it to ambush us with this at this point in 
time, and we note that — 
MR. DODD: Your Honor, ambushed? I'm the one that's 
being ambushed. 
THE COURT: Sit down, sit down. 
MR. PETERS: — that Counsel had plenty of opportunity 
to take this and impeach Ms. Cuenca by himself. He could have 
called h^r on u*ie szand aid said, uiesterday you testified 
-315-
1 there was no deal. Do you recognize this? Is that your 
2 signature? What does it say the deal is?" Yet no, he decides 
3 to go the route of waiting until now to throw this on us. 
4 THE COURT: He can argue his case the way he chooses to 
5 argue his case. 
6 MR. PETERS: I agree, but I think I ought to be able to 
7 respond. Second of all, Judge --
8 THE COURT: I asked you before if you needed some time 
9 to take to respond, and you said, "No, I'll go ahead and do it 
10 right now." So that's your response. 
11 MR. PETERS: Can I have an opportunity to look at that? 
12 Because there were two cases that Ms. Cuenca pled guilty in 
13 that day — 
14 THE COURT: What do you need to look at? 
15 MR. PETERS: The plea agreement, because it is my 
16 recollection that she pled to a first-degree felony in a 
17 separate case. 
18 (Counsel conferring off the record) 
19 MR. PETERS: This doesn't include the other case. 
20 Perhaps I should rethink my response and ask that we be able to 
21 go down and get the other case to show that she did plea to a 
22 first-degree felony. She was charged with a first-degree 
23 felony. She pled to a first-degree felony. 
24 Now, in full disclosure to the Court, it was a first-
25 degree felony that required, I think — well, before saying 
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that, I better look at the plea agreement, if I could have — 
take back and have some time to pull the other plea agreement9 
THE COURT. I don't have a problem with that You can 
go ahead and take what time you need to figure out what you 
want to do. The motion is on the table. Vfe'll take a recess 
and look at 11:30. If you need a little bit more time than 
that, make the request; but for now, 11:30, okay9 Be in 
recess. 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. 
(Recess taken) 
THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record. Mr. Peters, 
did you want to make an additional response to the motion to 
dismiss? 
MR. PETERS: Yes, Judge. I have here a certified copy 
of a plea deal that was reached simultaneously with the only 
one that the Judge has provided, interestingly enough. In that 
plea deal, Ms. Cuenca pled guilty to a first-degree felony. 
She was charged with a first-degree felony, and she pled guilty 
to a first-degree felony. 
In addition, on that plea deal it says the maximum — 
the minimum, max to -- punishment, five to J^ ife in prison. I'm 
sure the Court can recall, and we can recall the tape if 
possible, that Ms. Cuenca, when she was on the stand said, "As 
close as I can remember, I didn't get anything. I got five to 
life." Seems to be quite consistent with th,e simultaneous plea 
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1 deal that was entered into, I believe the exact same day. Let 
2 me just check the dates for that, your Honor. 
3 I think that Mr Dodd clearly questioned her on the 
4 issue of whether or not she got concurrent sentencmgs, and in 
5 my view I think it was established that she did get concurrent 
6 sentencing, which is I guess a plea deal of sorts, and that was 
7 on the record. 
8 So Judge, it's not that far of a stretch for a person 
9 who's charged with a first-degree felony and pleads to a first-
10 degree felony, and who knows that she's getting five to life to 
11 say, "I didn't get a deal." Now, for the record, it was 
12 actually a first-degree felony that required some mandatory 
13 prison time. She was charged with distribution of meth in a 
14 drug-free zone with a prior. That particular combination of 
15 charges requires mandatory prison time. I believe it's seven 
16 years. I'm not sure on that. 
17 The State did agree to not — to drop the drug-free 
18 zone, which didn't change the charge. It was still a first-
19 degree felony, because she had a prior djstribution, and it 
20 brought the mandatory prison from seven years down to five 
21 years. Five to life, precisely what Ms. Cuenca testified to 
22 earlier. 
23 The only — and I believe I've given the Court a 
24 certified copy, as well as Mr. Dodd — or a copy. I don't 
25 think Mr. Dodd's copy is certified. I believe that there's a 
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lot going on here, and that when a person pleads guilty to a 
first-degree felony and a second-degree felony, and they run it 
concurrent, and she's given five years to live in prison as the 
sentence on that, and then she comes and testifies, "I didn't 
get anything, I pled to what I was charged with," I don't think 
is a stretch to believe that she believed that she pled to 
what she was charged with It wasn't reduced in any kind — 
any sort of degree. The prison time that she understood is 
precisely what's in the plea agreement. 
Judge, I don't think there's a clear case of perjury 
here; and because of that, I would ask that the motion to 
dismiss be denied. 
THE COURT: Do you want this motion filed then? 
MR. DODD: Yes. Your Honor, as I mentioned before, in 
maybe a little more detail, you know, I went to bed last night 
with a heavy heart, not knowing what to do about this. Now 
Counsel's asserting — seems to be asserting that I've 
attempted to mislead you by only giving you one document. That 
I only supplied your Honor with one statement, and that I left 
out the statement that Shantel Cuenca has given to you. 
Your Honor, as I discussed yesterday, yesterday 
morning I fully expected Shantel Cuenca to testify favorably 
to my client When I found out that was not so, I called my 
secretary Daniel Price, and said, "Daniel, I need you to look 
up and see if she has any other convictions, and I need you to 
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1 look up and find out if she has any plea agreements with the 
2 State, and I need it now/' 
3 He came down and he found one, the one I handed you. 
4 He said, "This is all I could find " He said, "There's some 
5 other stuff, but I, you know, didn't get Jt." That's all I 
6 had. I didn't know if there was -- I didn't know what the 
7 deal was 
8 He just said that she pled guilty to a second degree, 
9 and that she was — m exchange for testimony. I didn't know 
10 what the original charges was, I didn't know what other — he 
11 said she has some other felony convictions. I didn't know what 
12 the deals were. So I asked her on the stand whether or not she 
13 got any sentencing, concurrent or consecutive, because I didn't 
14 know. I was asking her, trying to prod her memory to see if 
15 she was going to testify truthfully. 
16 Now, the State asserts, "Well, it's not really a 
17 deal, your Honor. So she really wasn't telling the jury a 
18 lie, because, hey, look, she pled to a first-degree five to 
19 life. She's in prison for a long time. We didn't give her 
20 a deal, and you know, we didn't even drop any charges." That 
21 is untrue. 
22 Charges were dropped on this one. I've been since 
23 able to look at it, looked it up. Charges on this, they 
24 dropped a paraphernalia charge on this one, they dropped drug-
25 free zone language. On the other case I did hand you, it was 
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pled down from a first-degree. I was able to see that last 
night, and see what was there, what charges were there. 
Ludicrous to assert that I'm trying to — or seem 
to assert that I'm trying to give you false information by 
only giving you one plea agreement. This plea agreement that 
they've given, what does it say9 The State agrees to amend 
Count I. It's amended. Obviously it's a lesser charge. 
"I will plead to Count III." The remaining counts will be 
dismissed. "The State agrees to recommend that we proceed 
with sentencing today." State allowed her to be sentenced 
then. "I agree to testify against Jullyn Doyle," May 5th, same 
date. Testimony changed. 
It can't be any clearer. Whether or not she understood 
it, I'm ready to call Ms. Jarvis, and I request to call her. 
The jury clearly heard, though, clearly heard from Ms. Cuenca, 
"I'm here of my own free will and choice. I'm just a good 
citizen and I'm telling you that Jullyn Doyle smoked meth," 
change of testimony. "No State didn't give me a deal for 
this." 
These documents prove otherwise. They prove otherwise 
that she was given a deal in exchange to testify against Jullyn 
Doyle. How much clearer can it be? Request to be able to call 
Ms Jarvis to the stand to testify. 
THE COURT: You can call Ms. Jarvis when the jury comes 
back m . That's your case, not before me. If you want to 
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1 impeach Ms. Cuenca, you need to do that in front of the jury — 
2 MR. DODD: I — 
3 THE COURT: — not before the Court. 
4 MR. DODD: -- certainly request that, your Honor, but 
5 the State is alleging that somehow Cuenca didn't think she was 
6 getting a deal. I'd like to call Ms. Jarvis to be able to 
7 testify of what she does --
8 THE COURT: You can do — 
9 MR. DODD: — with every one of her clients. 
10 THE COURT: — that before the jury. You're asking me 
11 to make a finding of fact in a case that the jury hasn't heard 
12 your side. 
13 MR. DODD: No, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: As far as the argument you're making — 
15 MR. DODD: I'm asking you — 
16 THE COURT: — if you want to impeach Ms. Cuenca, you 
17 need to do it in front of the jury. 
18 MR. DODD: I'm not asking to impeach Ms. Cuenca. 
19 I'm asking to present evidence to this Court that there was 
20 perjury. 
21 THE COURT: I don't find misconduct on the part of the 
22 State, number one. Whether or not she committed perjury is an 
23 issue for the jury to hear. You made your arguments. That's 
24 my finding. As far as discovery goes, you have that ability, 
25 as well as the State, to pick up discovery. That's the bottom 
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line. 
Your motion, I read through it carefully. I read the 
case. The case involved a post conviction motion The whole 
case hadn't been tried. This is different. You're bringing in 
this motion in the middle of the case. If you want to impeach 
Ms. Cuenca, do it in front of the ]ury. They're the finders of 
fact. 
MR. DODD: Your Honor, xn the alternative I'll move for 
a mxstrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. 
THE COURT: Denied. 
MR. DODD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You motion to dismiss is also denied. 
MR. DODD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do we need to take a break, or do we need 
to — how many — can you present your ne,xt witness, Mr. Dodd, 
wxthin the next 40 mxnutes? Can we get that done before we 
take a lunch break, or do you need — should we just take a 
lunch now and come back? 
then, 
for € 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
DODD: 
COURT 
I think we 
Okay. 
should 
PETERS: I would request 
COURT: All right. 
for lunch. Let's return 
everybody? 
MR. DODD: Yes. 
We'll 
at — 
take 
the 
go 
is 1 
a lunch 
same. 
ahead 
break now. 
and recess, 
or clock enough time 
